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Whenever a copyright law is to be made or altered, 






 web-based music streaming platforms such as Pandora 
and Spotify have become staples to music listeners, providing free and 
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the invaluable insight and comments of Professor Ben Depoorter, and the unwavering support of
my partner, Gabriel, and my mother.  This note is for them.
1. MARK TWAIN, NOTEBOOK 382 (1935).
2. “Freemium” is term describing a business model that allows content providers to price 
discriminate by offering two versions of their service: free to users (but usually with bandwidth 
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legal content to users. It remains an open question, however, whether this 
will hurt or help digital revenue.
3
  To put things into perspective, the first 
half of 2015 saw over one trillion streams worldwide—the highest yet.
4
  
But while these new streaming services appear to have shifted consumers 
from pirate services to legally licensed and paid services through growth in 
user base,
5
 neither Pandora nor Spotify have become profitable businesses.
6
  
Even where the recorded music industry is suffering losses in sales, both 
digital and physical,
7
 expansion of the royalty bearing pool for the Alliance 
of Artists and Recording Companies (“AARC”) can be a source of 
significant increased revenues.  This is not to suggest that the Audio Home 
Recording Act is a solution to online piracy, but a tool to shift the direct 
costs of piracy on the U.S. music industry
8
 to consumers and the consumer 
electronic industry that directly and indirectly benefit from piracy. 
limitations, more advertisements, fewer products, or some combination of the three) and premium 
for a fee. John M. Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2013). 
3. Victor Luckerson, Spotify and YouTube Are Just Killing Digital Music Sales, TIME (Jan.
3, 2014), http://business.time.com/2014/01/03/spotify-and-youtube-are-just-killing-digital-music-
sales/ (pointing out that the swift rise of streaming while digital revenue continued to slip does 
not clarify whether this shift will help or hurt the music industry in the long run).  
4. This number is aggregated across YouTube, Vevo (not counting overlap with 
YouTube), Vimeo, Spotify, Rdio, SoundCloud, and Pandora. Data to Date: The Rapid Rise of 
Social and Streaming, NEXT BIG SOUND, https://www.nextbigsound.com/industryreport/2015 
summer (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).  
5. “The subscription model is leading to more payment for music by consumers, many of
whom appear to be shifting from pirate services to a licensed music environment that pays artists 
and rights holders.”  See Facts and Stats, IFPI.ORG, http://www.ifpi.org/facts-and-stats.php (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015).  Most notably, paid subscribers to subscriptions services rose to 28 million 
in 2013 globally.  See id.; see also Lars Brandle, Streaming Services Make Inroads Into Piracy 
Down Under, Spotify’s Will Page Tells Bigsound, BILLBOARD (Sept. 10, 2014, 4:31 AM), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/6244180/streaming-services-make-inroads-
into-piracy-down-under-spotifys-will-page (reporting that piracy volume and population are 
trending downwards in Australia after Spotify’s introduction of their service there). 
6. The royalties doom services that base their business on mechanical licensing, leading to
the conclusion that they are intrinsically unprofitable. See Stuart Dredge, Spotify, Pandora and 
the Profits Problem for Streaming Music, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/01/spotify-pandora-streaming-music-profits; 
Lucas Mearian, Music Industry Sucks Life from Subscription Services, COMPUTER WORLD (Feb. 
14, 2014, 3:33 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2487757/e-commerce/music-
industry-sucks-life-from-subscription-services.html; see also Joshua Brustein, Spotify Hits 10 
Million Paid Users. Now Can It Make Money?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 21, 2014), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-05-21/why-spotify-and-the-streaming-music-industry-cant-mak 
e-money; Paul Bonanos, Pandora Beats Revenue Expectations, But Falls Short of Profits, 
BILLBOARD (July 24, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-
mobile/6186144/pandora-beats-revenue-expectations-but-falls-short-of.
7. A 2004 study estimated that 20% of U.S. downloaded songs would be purchased 
legally.  Martin Pietz & Patrick Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-
Section Evidence, 1 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 71, 78 (2004). 
8. A 2007 study estimated that the U.S. sound recording industry’s direct global losses due
to piracy were $5.33 billion. Steven E. Siwek, The True Cost of Sound Recording Piracy to the 
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The music industry is fending off attacks from all sides with the 
myriad of creative and free ways to infringe in 2015,
9
 from streaming to 
peer-to-peer (“p2p”) piracy to the rise of YouTube.
10
  The time for 
comprehensive copyright reform is ripe.
11
  In February 2015, the Copyright 
Office released a report highlighting the need for significant licensing 
reform, adducing that existing copyright schemes are no longer practical.
12
 
At the time of its passage, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 
(“AHRA” or “the Act”) was seen as a reasonable compromise between the 
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), the consumer 
electronics industry, and consumers.
13
  It was intended to provide proper 
compensation to copyright owners by mandating royalties for certain 
technologies to compensate copyright owners for losses from home taping, 
while simultaneously shielding manufacturers and consumers from 
infringement liability.
14
  With the explosive adoption of digitalization and 
Internet usage,
15
 consumption of music is now inextricably intertwined 
with digital media.
16
  However, the AHRA has not been able to keep up 
U.S. Economy, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION 12, 14 (Aug. 2007), http://www.ipi.org/docLib/ 
20120515_SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf. Losses to U.S. retail industries that sell or rent sound 
recoding products were estimated to total $1.04 billion. Id. Total direct losses to all U.S. 
industries due to music piracy were estimated to exceed $6.37 billion. Id. 
9. NDP, a market reporting service used by RIAA, reported that in 2009, only 37% of
music acquired in the U.S. was paid for.  Scope of the Problem, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/ 
physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy-online-scope-of-the-problem (last visited Mar. 5, 
2015).   
10. One can easily rip mp3s directly from YouTube for download. See Don’t Just Watch . . .
ListenToYoutube.com, http://www.listentoyoutube.com/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
11. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013).
12. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE
(2015), http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf.  
13. “The purpose of [the AHRA] is to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or
digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.” S. REP. NO. 
102-294, at 30 (1992), 1992 WL 133198. It also provided for a royalty collection scheme and
required a serial copy management system that would “prohibit the serial copying of copyrighted
music.” Id.
14. Id.
15. According to The World Bank, only 1.7% of the United States population used the
Internet in 1992, compared with 84.2% in 2014. World Development Indicators, THE WORLD 
BANK, http://www.data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). At the 
time of passage, Congress did not foresee the ascendancy of the Internet. Id. 
16. A national survey of 2,002 randomly selected Americans age 12 or older found that
more than 71% owned a smartphone, 54% identified the Internet as the most essential medium 
(over television, radio, and newspaper), 44% used the Internet the most to learn about new music, 
and Pandora was surveyed as the leading Internet-only audio service.  See The Infinite Dial 2015, 
EDISON RESEARCH (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.edisonresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
03/InfiniteDial2015.pdf; see also Internet Radio Passes Major Milestone as More than Half of 
Americans Are Now Monthly Users, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.businesswire. 
com/news/home/20150304006259/en/Internet-Radio-Passes-Major-Milestone-Americans-Monthl 
y#.VPlHZ1PF-iZ.  
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with the rapid pace of technological advancement due to Congress’ passage 
of narrow statutory language;
17
 proving that Congress’s view was 
shortsighted by a general consensus that the AHRA is irrelevant despite of 
its well-intentioned bargain.
18
  A robust copyright regime can only be as 
effective as it is adaptable to the unpredictable technological environment 
in which it exists because copyright is a reactive body of law.
19
 
The AHRA has spawned little litigation.  The AARC filed two 
consolidated class actions against major car companies (Ford, General 
Motors,
20
 Chrysler, and Mitsubishi), and against technology companies 
(Denso and Clarion
21
) claiming entitlements to unpaid royalties due under 
the AHRA.
22
  Denso and Clarion manufacture in-vehicle media copying 
devices, preinstalled in Ford, GM, Chrysler, and Mitsubishi cars.  The 
devices allow users to store a compact disc’s (“CD”) audio contents onto a 
hard drive so that they are available for playback later.
23
 
The AARC’s lawsuit is premised on the argument that a company 
cannot escape liability by claiming multifunctionality in light of 
technological advances.  Indeed, the “primary purpose” test applied by the 
Ninth Circuit drove a stake in the AHRA’s heart.  The defendants maintain 
that they are exempt from the AHRA’s royalty requirement because their 
music hard drives are multipurpose.  Nonetheless, the Federal District 
Court of Washington, D.C. may find that Ford and similar car 
manufacturers’ use of copying devices and marketing the ability to copy 
music directly into the car’s hard drive means that the devices’ “primary 
17. “When one reflects that the ‘need’ for [arbitrary specifications] was in fact nonexistent,
it is an occasion for some sadness in the annals of sensible lawmaking.”  DAVID NIMMER, 
COPYRIGHT ILLUMINATED: REFOCUSING THE DIFFUSE U.S. STATUTE 103 (2008). 
18. Id.
19. See Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1847 (2009) (observing that legal uncertainty pervades all areas of the 
law, but especially so in copyright where there is constant need to respond to issues raised by 
unpredictable technological advances). 
20. See Complaint at 1, Alliance of Artists and Recording Cos. v. Gen. Motors Co., No. 14-
cv-1271 (D.D.C. July 25, 2014), 2014 WL 3735190; see also Andrew Flanagan, Ford, General
Motors Sued for Unpaid Royalties, BILLBOARD (July 28, 2014), http://www.billboard.com
/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/6190833/ford-general-motors-sued-for-unpaid-royalties.
21. Judge Orders Consolidation of 2 AHRA Suits Against Automakers, CONSUMER ELEC.




22. See Complaint at 1, Alliance of Artists and Recording Cos. v. Chrysler Grp., No. 14-cv-
1920 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2014); see also Richard Smirke, Music Industry Sues Chrysler, Mitsubishi 
Over In-Car Recording Devices, BILLBOARD (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.billboard.com 
/articles/business/6334855/aarc-sues-chrysler-mitsubishi-private-copying-leavies. 
23. Flanagan, supra note 20.
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purpose” is to make digital audio copied recordings.
24
  In 1992, who could 
have predicted that today there would be touch-screen phones capable of 
instantaneous internet connection that enables consumers to live stream a 
video in high definition or that in the near future that Wi-Fi would be 
available not only on planes, but in cars?
25
  Regardless of the outcome, the 
current lawsuit highlights the need to contextualize copyright law with the 
realities of the digital age, the speed of emerging consumer technological 
advances, and the market for these new technologies. 
This note’s interest in the Act lies in the speed and unpredictability of 
human innovation and consumer behavior.
26
  Today, computers and the 
Internet play a major role in the recording, distribution, and playback of 
music.
27
  At the same time, the Internet has continually enabled people to 
use its power for infringement.
28
  Since Napster’s introduction of “p2p” 
file-sharing in 1999, music sales have dropped 53% from $14.6 billion to 
$7 billion in 2013.
29
  Global music piracy has been estimated to contribute 
$12.5 billion in economic losses annually to the United States’ economy.
30
 
New trends in music consumption demonstrate unpredictability due to 
the speed of technological and digital innovation and the ease of copyright 
infringement in the digital age.  But even then, personal preferences and 
consumption are fickle, varied, and unpredictable.  Take vinyl records, for 
example, which grew 52% over the course of 2013-2014 and the 9.2 
24. The drafters intended “primary purpose” to mean “a purpose that exceeds 50 percent of
all purposes.” S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 47 (1992), 1992 WL 133198. 
25. In January 2015, Verizon Communications, a U.S. telecommunications company,
announced the Verizon Vehicle, a proposed car accessory and service for $14.99 per month that 
“will empower the millions of drivers who have been locked out of the digital experience” 
through a car’s diagnostic port.  Ina Fried, Verizon Aims to Connect Older Cars with $15-a-
Month Service, RE/CODE (Jan. 13, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://recode.net/2015/01/13/verizon-aims-
to-connect-older-cars-with-new-service/.  The service will offer features ranging from parking 
spot tracking to car diagnostics help to roadside assistance.  Id. The service is targeted at the 
entire market, offered the same price for Verizon and non-Verizon phone customers alike, with a 
hint to consumers to “[s]tay tuned” for in-car Wi-Fi.  Id. 
26. See Sofia Ritala, Note, Pandora & Spotify: Legal Issues and Licensing Requirements for
Interactive and Non-Interactive Internet Radio Broadcasters, 54 IDEA 23 (2013) (comparing 
business models of music streaming platforms); Skylar Bergl, The World’s Top 10 Most 
Innovative Companies in Music, FAST CO. (Apr. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany 
.com/3026681/most-innovative-companies-2014/the-worlds-top-10-most-innovative-companies-i 
n-music.
27. AMNON LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS,
CHALLENGES 73 (2013). 
28. See, e.g., ENVISIONAL, TECHNICAL REPORT: AN ESTIMATE OF INFRINGING USE OF THE
INTERNET 3–5 (2011) (estimating that 17.53% of U.S. internet traffic was infringing, transfer of 
infringing content on p2p networks comprising 13.8% of all internet traffic, only one of 
BitTorrent’s 10,000 most popular pieces of content noncopyrighted). 
29. Scope of the Problem, RIAA, supra note 9.
30. Siwek, supra note 8.
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million copies sold represented the highest number since Nielsen started 
tracking music sales in 1991.
31
  This served as a reminder to everyone that 
the physical music format predecessor of the cassette tape, which itself is 
the predecessor of the DC, is not dead.  It was only a matter of time before 
digital revenue surpassed physical revenue.
32
  But even though digital 
revenue is becoming more complex, music downloads have dropped while 
streaming and vinyl grow.
33
  CD sales fell 19.1% in the first half of 2014 
with physical formats accounting for only 28% of music revenue, 
compared to digital’s 68% (41% downloads plus 27% streaming).
34
  The 
RIAA estimates that the U.S. music marketplace revenue is at $2.2 billion, 
down from $2.3 billion at mid-year in 2013.
35
 
Fair compensation under the Copyright Act can, and was intended to, 
be addressed by the AHRA.  Part II will explain the context in which the 
AHRA was passed and how it fits within the larger scheme of the 
Copyright Act.  As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he immediate effect 
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative 
labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.”
36
  This section will examine the 
AHRA’s key definition of digital audio recording devices (“DARDs”) and 
how it has been applied.  It will also show how the narrow statutory 
language of the 1992 amendment is inconsistent with the rest of the 
Copyright Act. 
Part III will elaborate on why the AHRA has been called “the worst 
thing that ha[s] ever happened to the Copyright Act.”
37
  It will measure the 
31. Keith Caulfield, Vinyl Album Sales Hit Historic High in 2014, Again, BILLBOARD (Dec.
31, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/6422442/vinyl-album-
sales-hit-historic-high-2014; Kelsey McKinney, Vinyl Record Sales in 2014 Were the Highest 
They’ve Been Since 1993, VOX (Jan 5. 2015, 12:40 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015/1/5/7494461/ 
vinyl-record-sales-2014.  
32. In 2011, digital music sales surpassed physical sales with an increase of 8.4%, climbing 
to 50.3% of all music purchases for the first time in history.  Jasmine A. Braxton, Note, Lost in 
Translation: The Obstacles of Streaming Digital Media and the Future of Transnational 
Licensing, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 193, 201 (2014); Sam Gustin, Digital Music Sales 
Finally Surpassed Physical Sales in 2011, TIME (Jan 6, 2012), http://business.time. 
com/2014/01/03/spotify-and-youtube-are-just-killing-digital-music-sales/.  
33. Ethan Smith, Music Downloads Plummet in U.S., but Sales of Vinyl Records and
Streaming Surge, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/music-downloads-plum 
met-in-u-s-but-sales-of-vinyl-records-and-streaming-surge-1420092579?cb=logged0.5412101105 
321199. 
34. Ed Christman, U.S. Music Revenues Down Nearly 5%, Says RIAA, BILLBOARD (Sept.
25, 2014; 4:59 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/record-labels/6266341/us-music-
revenues-down-nearly-5-says-riaa. 
35. Id.
36. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
37. Nimmer, supra note 17, at 103.
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success of the AHRA in numbers to show how it has failed, and thus 
demonstrates the need for legal intervention to ensure fair compensation in 
accordance with the quid pro quo of copyright law. 
Part IV will compare the AHRA’s royalty with similar levies in 
Europe and Canada (with a specific focus on Finland) and discuss 
Congress’ intentions for copyright reform.  Copyright protection is 
territorial, despite attempts at providing an international standard,
38
 and 
incongruent policies create disincentives for artist creation in countries 
where their works are not properly compensated.  Finally, this note will 
present a proposal to amend the AHRA to better suit the realities of the 
digital age by widening the royalty-bearing base.  As Congress is currently 
examining the Copyright Act in order to introduce changes, it is time to 
amend the AHRA’s narrow language to reconcile the statute’s intended 
purpose with the realities of its implementation.
39
 
This note will conclude by suggesting two steps on how to realign the 
AHRA with its statutory intent, which was based on comparative 
international examples, while allowing the United States to meet its 
international obligations.  The first step involves shifting the underlying 
assumptions to a more realistic expectation of how music is consumed, 
copied, and transferred like in Europe.  The second step is to amend and 
broaden the definitions of DARD’s, like in Canada, or to create a 
compensation fund provided directly by the state, as in Finland. 
II. Why the AHRA: Technological Innovation, Mass
Infringement, and the Copyright Act 
Congress’ power to grant limited monopolies is rooted in the 
Copyright Clause,
40
 and “involves a difficult balance between the interests 
of authors . . . in the control and exploitation of their writings and 
discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free 
flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our . . . 
copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.”
41
  New technological 
innovations, from the printing press to audio recorders to the Internet, have 
historically been identified by copyright law as new tools for enabling 
38. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. IV, July 
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO]. 
39. See Pallante, supra note 11; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 12.
40. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
41. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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infringement.
42
  A look back in time at various consumer technologies will 
best help to understand the climate in which the AHRA was passed and 
serve as a guide to the legislative intent behind it. 
A. Videocassette Recorders and the Birth of the Home Taping Exception
In 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that “time-shifting”—consumers
creating individual copies of complete television shows on videocassette 
recorders (“VCR”) tapes to watch at a later date—was fair use, and thus 
shielded Sony and other VCR manufacturers from infringement liability.
43
  
The RIAA’s goal in protecting the integrity of its members’ copyrights 
directly conflicted with the consumer-electronics industry.  By pushing the 
limits of fair use, Sony and its competitors sought to shield themselves and 
their customers from infringement liability in order to maximize the 
potential consumer electronics market.  VCR’s, an analog technology, were 
exempted from infringement liability under the fair use doctrine, narrowly 
allowing home taping for “time-shifting” purposes.
44
  With the birth of the 
home taping exception expanded by the AHRA and cemented by the Ninth 




B. The Digital Era and Serial Copying
By 1986, however, the digital age had come to stay with the
introduction of the first digital audio tape (“DAT”), which enabled 
consumers to make quality home copies of prerecorded music.
46
  DAT 
technology would not only enable consumers to make copies of original 
works purchased commercially, but also copies of copies without 
decreasing quality.
47
  As audio recording technology became increasingly 
refined, copyright infringement through digital copying no longer suffered 
in quality.
48
  This was alarming because analog recordings, by contrast, 
42. RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES & THE LAW: FORMS AND
ANALYSIS § 5.24 (2014). 
43. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
44. Home “time-shifting”—the private noncommercial practice of recording a program at
home for later viewing and erasing it afterwards—was found to be fair use. Id. at 423, 455. 
45. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 2, at 2 (1992).
47. Id.
48. Richard S. Ginell, Got Dat? Digital Audio Tape Is Coming Soon, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 4,
1986), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-12-04/features/8603310860_1_dat-conventional-
cassettes-digital-audio-tape.  
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suffered progressive degradation in sound quality when copied.
49
  The 
recorded music industry’s monopoly on manufacturing quality sound 
recordings had ended, which was hugely concerning to the industry. 
In 1990, Academy Award-winning songwriter Sammy Cahn and four 
music publishers filed class actions against Sony for contributory 
infringement in an attempt to block their importation of DATs into the 
United States.
50
  Serial copying, later defined as the “duplication in a digital 
format of a copyrighted musical work or sound recording from a digital 
reproduction of a digital musical recording,”
51
 was Cahn’s major concern 
because it was enabled by the lack of degradation between subsequent 
copies.
52
  The suit was settled in 1991 as part of a larger compromise 
between the recording industry and the consumer electronics industry 
wherein the latter would establish implementation of a serial copying 
management system.
53
  Sony and Philips, who sought to bring their DATs 
to U.S. consumers (Minidiscs and Digital Compact Cassettes, respectively) 
bowed to the RIAA’s threats of a lawsuit and DATs never became the 
digital recording medium of choice for consumers.
54
  This compromise 
would ultimately become codified as the AHRA.
55
 
49. Benton J. Gaffney, Copyright Statutes that Regulate Technology: A Comparative
Analysis of the Audio Home Recording Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 75 WASH. 
L. REV. 611, 616 (2000).
50. Complaint at 1, Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991).  The
suit was filed “on behalf of all owners of copyrights in musical compositions, and all transferees 
of the exclusive rights to authorize the making of sound recordings and the distribution of 
phonorecords, who are entitled to receive mechanical royalties from record companies licensed 
by The Harry Fox Agency, Inc.” Id. ¶ 10. 
51. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2014).
52. Analog copying required a physical process of playing the original recording while the 
phonograph’s stylus’s mechanical movements are transmitted into an electrical signal that is later 
amplified.  Analog’s dependency on physical process allowed distortion and interference in the 
quality of sound, resulting in sound degradation between subsequent copies from the original.  
Digital copying, however, converts sound into a mathematical series of 1s and 0s, which is then 
reassembled without any deviation from the original, resulting in perfect copies.  N. Jansen 
Calamita, Note, Coming to Terms with the Celestial Jukebox: Keeping the Sound Recording 
Copyright Viable in the Digital Age, 74 B.U. L. REV. 505, 515–16 (1994). 
53. Lewis Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
and the Formation of Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 497, 501 (1998). 
54. After years of legal and legislative holdbacks keeping DAT products from market,
consumer interest waned and the market for DATs never developed.  KEVIN PARKS, MUSIC & 
COPYRIGHT IN AMERICA: TOWARD THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 162 (2012).  
55. Kurlantzik & Pennino, supra note 53; S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 33 (1992), 1992 WL 
133198. 
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C. The AHRA: A (Not-So) Great Compromise
Congress passed the AHRA to resolve debates over distribution of
technologies,
56
 enabling home taping of copyrighted works between device 
manufacturers and the music industry that had spanned two decades.
57
  
After Sony’s home taping exception, the AHRA expanded the exception to 
digital copying, and effectively legalized home taping for noncommercial 
private use under the condition that such devices were manufactured with a 
serial copying management system and paid a royalty.
58
  However, unlike 
traditional copyright law, which granted clear rights and remedies to 
authors, the AHRA replaced the black and white infringement (and 
contributory infringement) system with a serial copy protection and blanket 
royalty payments on qualifying equipment, defined with specificity.
59
 
The legislative history of the Act reveals it was a “direct response to 
the needs of the music industry, the consumer electronics industry, and 
consumers.”
60
  Congress’s primary intent in passing the AHRA was to 
“[e]nsure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio recordings 
of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.”
61
  To balance 
this, the Act also implemented a “royalty payment system that provides 
modest compensation to the various elements of the music industry for the 
digital home recordings of copyrighted music.”
62
  In addition, it mandated a 
“serial copy management system that would prohibit the digital serial 
copying of copyrighted music.”
63
 
The AHRA shielded consumers from infringement actions for private 
noncommercial copying,
64
 premising the collection of the royalty on 
qualifying “digital audio recording devices”
65
 and “digital audio recording 
56. H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, pt. 1, at 9 (1992).
57. RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 42.
58. The royalty was set at two percent of the transfer price for DARDs and three percent for
DARMs distributed in the U.S., both imported and manufactured, with slightly different 
calculations of the royalty-bearing base depending on if the device was sold in combination. See 
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 2 106 Stat. 4237, 4241–42 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (2013)). 
59. Brendan M. Schulman, Note, The Song Heard ‘Round the World: The Copyright
Implications of MP3s and the Future of Digital Music, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 589, 607–08 
(1999). 
60. S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 33 (1992), 1992 WL 133198.
61. Id. at 51.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id.
64. “No action may be brought under this title . . . based on the noncommercial use by a
consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical 
recordings.”  17 U.S.C. § 1008. 
65. Digital audio recording devices are defined as:
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media”
66
 used to copy “digital musical recording[s].”
67
  The statute 
included a specific exemption for computers.
68
  In return, featured artists 
and copyright owners who registered for membership with the AARC were 
entitled to yearly distribution of royalties collected.
69
 
The AHRA seemed progressive on its face because it served the 
public interest by protecting private access, while attempting to somewhat 
compensate the music industry for the direct loss in profits brought on by 
the emergence of digital copying technologies available to consumers.
70
  
However, practical application is another matter.  For example, digital 
audio recording mediums (“DARMs”) conditioned the three percent 
transfer price royalty on whether it was “primarily marketed” for making 
digital audio copied recordings with DARDs.  This means that the United 
States does not collect royalties on blank CDs or DVDs, but only on blank 
CDs that are labeled and sold for music use.  Similarly, the United States 
does not collect on CD burners in computers, but only on stand-alone CD 
[A]ny machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals for
use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of some other
machine or device, the digital recording function of which is designed or
marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a digital
audio copied recording for private use, except for— (A) professional model
products, and (B) dictation machines, answering machines, and other audio
recording equipment that is designed and marketed primarily for the creation
of sound recordings resulting from the fixation of nonmusical sounds.
17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2013). 
66. Digital audio recording media is defined as:
[A]ny material object in a form commonly distributed for use by individuals,
that is primarily marketed or most commonly used by consumers for the
purpose of making digital audio copied recordings by use of a digital audio
recording device. (B) Such term does not include any material object— (i)
that embodies a sound recording at the time it is first distributed by the
importer or manufacturer; or (ii) that is primarily marketed and most
commonly used by consumers either for the purpose of making copies of
motion pictures or other audiovisual works or for the purpose of making
copies of nonmusical literary works, including computer programs or data
bases.
Id. 
67. Digital musical recording is defined as:
[A] material object—(i) in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only
sounds, and material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed
sounds, if any, and (ii) from which the sounds and material can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.
Id. 
68. “A ‘digital musical recording’ does not include a material object . . . in which one or
more computer programs are fixed[.]”  Id. 
69. ALLIANCE OF ARTISTS AND RECORDING COS., http://wp.aarcroyalties.com/ahra (last
visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
70. LUCAS HILDERBRAND, INHERENT VICE 102 (2009).
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burners.  Realistically speaking, the vast majority of consumers buy blank 
CDs for burning music.
71
  Manufacturers of computers, smart phones, 
tablets, and blank discs do not have an incentive to make and market their 
products as single-use for the simple fact that it is not a competitive move.  
Doing so would subject its products (and ultimately consumers) to the 
copying of royalty fees and lessen the products’ appeal when compared to 
multifunctional products that encompass its own features—bundling 
features would bolster its competitive appeal to consumers and escape the 
tax. 
D. Computer Exemption Leaves Gaping Hole
The history of consumer technology shows that the invention,
development, and adoption of new technologies are premature by years or 
off the mark entirely.
72
  As a responsive body of law, the Copyright Act’s 
attempts to craft forward-looking and flexible laws do not always match its 
predictive goals.
73
  “New uses should not necessarily result in the 
weakening of a previously broad protection of ownership,”
74
 but because 
the AHRA was a targeted response to DATs, it did not share the same 
flexible, future-proof definitions as the rest of the Copyright Act.
75
 
David Nimmer, renowned expert in copyright law, expressed his 
dismay that the pro-music intent underlying the 1992 amendment turned 
Title 17 into a “hopeless mishmash”
76
 and a “forbidding jungle of arbitrary 
specifications.”
77
  In 1992, Congress passed the AHRA on the assumption 
that DATs were set to become the next big thing, the future of digital 
music.
78
  Personal computers, by comparison, were used for “a variety of 
financial and technical applications having nothing to do with music.”
79
  By 
71. Tim Armstrong, What Are Canadian Consumers Getting for Their Blank Fees?, 
INFO/LAW (Sept. 5, 2006), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/09/05/what-are-canadian-
consumers-getting-for-their-blank-cd-r-fees/ 
72. Depoorter, supra note 19, at 1840 (pointing out famous examples such as the creation of
Xerox after leaving Kodak when the copying process idea was dismissed, and IBM’s dismissal of 
the notion of a market for home computers).   
73. HILDERBRAND, supra note 70, at 101–03.
74. LEHAVI, supra note 27.
75. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (containing broad and vague definitions such as “[a] ‘device’,
‘machine’, or ‘process’ is one now known or later developed”) and 17 U.S.C § 1001 (containing 
fact-specific definitions such as “‘digital audio recording medium’’ as any material object in a 
form commonly distributed for use by individuals, that is primarily marketed or most commonly 
used by consumers for the purpose of making digital audio copied recordings by use of a digital 
audio recording device”). 
76. NIMMER, supra note 17, at 103.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 104.
79. Id. at 105.
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adhering to a premature opinion about technology, any hopes for just 
compensation under the AHRA died with the DAT.
80
  The AHRA 




The Ninth Circuit in RIAA v. Diamond—the first and only litigated 
case arising under the AHRA
82
—significantly diminished the scope of the 
AHRA by categorically exempting copies made through an intermediary 
computer.  There, the RIAA and AARC brought a lawsuit against Diamond 
Multimedia Systems for its Rio portable MP3 player, alleging it was a 
DARD that did not have a serial copying management system and did not 
pay royalties as required by the AHRA.
83
  The Rio included software that 
allowed users to rip music from a CD, convert it to MP3 format for storage 
on a computer’s hard drive, and then transfer the MP3 from the hard drive 
to the player itself.
84
  In order for the Rio to fall within the definition of a 
DARD, it had to be able to reproduce a digital music recording “‘directly’ 
or ‘from a transmission.’”
85
  Computers and their hard drives did not fall 
within the AHRA’s definition of DARDs under a plain meaning 
interpretation “because their ‘primary purpose’ [was] not to make digital 
audio copied recordings.”
86
  The Ninth Circuit thus held that, “[b]ecause 
the Rio cannot make copies from transmissions, but instead, can only make 
copies from a computer hard drive, it is not a [DARD].”
87
  This huge 
exemption effectively eviscerated the AHRA because “any recording 
device could evade AHRA regulation simply by passing the music through 
a computer.”
88
  But, while the Ninth Circuit acknowledged this gaping 
loophole, it deferred to Congress’s expressly designed intent in applying a 
“primary purpose” requirement to devices, leading to the unfortunate 
conclusion that “computers are not digital audio recording devices.”
89
 
Applying RIAA v. Diamond to the current AARC litigation certainly 
favors the auto manufacturers’ arguments because hard drives are indeed 
multi-purpose beyond mp3 copying.  However, this fact only strengthens 
80. Id.
81. Id. at 106.
82. Id. at 105.
83. RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
84. David Balaban, Note, The Battle of the Music Industry: The Distribution of Audio and
Video Works Via the Internet, Music and More, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
235, 265 (2001) (citing RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. (RIAA I), 29 F. Supp. 2d 624, 625 
(C.D. Cal. 1998)) 
85. RIAA, 180 F.3d at 1077.
86. Id. at 1078.
87. Id. at 1081.
88. RIAA I, at 630.
89. RIAA, 180 F.3d at 1078.
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why the AHRA is obsolete and in sore need of a facelift.  A consumer 
electronics manufacturer can bypass the AHRA by simply bundling 
functionalities because making a particular technology or medium multi-
purpose exempts the manufacturer from the AHRA.
90
  But, the consumer 
technology industry already has an incentive to bundle features due to the 
nature of competitive markets and consumer expectations of convenience 
and multifunctionality.  There is no need for Congress to create an 
incentive, let alone at the direct cost of the content creators that fill iPods 
and hard drives.  Manufacturers of blank CDs or other storage mediums 
draw much of their market share from consumer expectation, intention, and 
anticipated ability to use such products to make copies of copyright works. 
III. Measuring the AHRA’s “Success” and How Narrow
Statutory Language Doomed It from the Start
The AARC was formed as a nonprofit entity to collect and distribute 
royalties generated by the AHRA from qualifying consumer products that 
allowed users to make noncommercial copies of copyrighted works.
91
  The 
AARC distributed $100,000 in royalties to 1120 members in its first year
92
 
and almost $5.5 million to 200,000 members in 2012, its twentieth year.
93
  
Today, the AARC boasts a membership of over 500,000 artists and record 
labels worldwide.
94
  $5.5 million in royalties in a single year may seem like 
a lot, but it is pitifully meager within the context of the recording industry’s 
$5.9 billion in digital revenue worldwide.
95
  The AARC’s effectiveness in 
collecting and distributing royalties declined sharply in the past three years, 
but not for lack of devices being imported, manufactured, and sold in the 
United States with copying capabilities.
96
  The U.S. Copyright Office 
issued a rule that will allow copyright owners to audit statements of 
accounts and royalty fees that are collected on their behalf.  However, those 
looking for lost royalties owed to them by the AARC likely will not find 
much.
97
  They would be better served looking to the main source for this 
lack of income—the AHRA itself. 
90. Id. at 1072.
91. AHRA is a nonprofit similar to BMI and ASCAP.  See ALLIANCE OF ARTISTS AND
RECORDING COMPANIES, supra note 69. 
92. Linda R. Bocchi, A Letter from AARC’s Executive Director (May 20, 2013),
http://wp.aarcroyalties.com/2013/05/20/a-letter-from-aarcs-executive-director/.  
93. Id.
94. See ALLIANCE OF ARTISTS AND RECORDING COMPANIES, supra note 69.
95. See Facts and Stats, supra note 5.
96. Even in its best year (2000), the AARC’s only collected $5,280,536.64. See Bocchi,
supra note 92. 
97. NewsNet, Office Issues Final Rule on Auditing Statements of Account and Royalty Fees, 
COPYRIGHT.GOV (Nov. 18, 2014), http://copyright.gov/newsnet/2014/562.html. 
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The unpredictability of music consumption trends, along with the 
revenue streams that follow, make it especially difficult for musicians to 
predict or invest in their creative output.  Musicians are deeply affected by 
mass infringement and piracy and struggle to make up the revenue 
elsewhere.  Taylor Swift, the top-selling artist of 2014, opined: 
  There are many (many) people who predict the downfall of 
music sales and the irrelevancy of the album as an economic 
entity.  I am not one of them.  In my opinion, the value of an 
album is, and will continue to be, based on the amount of heart 
and soul an artist has bled into a body of work, and the financial 
value that artists (and their labels) place on their music when it 
goes out into the marketplace.  Piracy, file sharing and streaming 
have shrunk the numbers of paid album sales drastically, and 
every artist has handled this blow differently.
98
 
As discussed, the AHRA’s reputation as a dead letter law doomed to 
obsolescence is because it was far too technologically specific—defining 
DARDs and DARMs too narrowly while granting specific exemptions to 
computer hard drives.  In order to inject relevance back into this section of 
the Copyright Act, “Congress needs to see the evolution of technology and 
related businesses with some objectivity and to consider, as appropriate, the 
rulings and the frustrations of the courts before it can move forward.”
99
 
IV. No Need to Reinvent the Wheel:
Looking Abroad for Answers
Copyright infringement of music can be achieved with the click of a 
button and by easily accessible technologies—it need not and does not wait 
for specific technology designed for infringement.  Infringement will 
happen if there is capable technology.  “Whenever technological advances 
create new means of making copies or communicating copyrighted works, 
difficult questions arise as to how boundaries should be drawn around new 
uses of content created by the new technology.”
100
  This is a fact that has 
concerned copyright protectionists the world over. 
98. Taylor Swift, Op-Ed., For Taylor Swift, the Future of Music Is a Love Story, WALL ST. 
J. (July 7, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/for-taylor-swift-the-future-of-music-is-a-love-
story-1404763219.
99. Pallante, supra note 11, at 344.
100. Depoorter, supra note 19, at 1835.
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A. The European Example
The European Union (“E.U.”) version of the AHRA, the Information
Society Directive (“Directive”), also mandates a levy on manufacturers and 
imports of digital audio recording devices and mediums if member states 
decide to allow for a private copying exemption.
101
  The Directive goes 





  The Directive’s Recital 11 of The Preamble states that its levy 
regime is “a rigorous, effective system for the protection of copyright and 
related rights is one of the main ways of ensuring that European cultural 
creativity and production receive the necessary resources and of 
safeguarding the independence and dignity of artistic creators and 
performers.”
104
  The Directive harmonized national laws among E.U. 
Member States, but, for the comparable portions regarding fair use rights, 
only set out basic statutory minimums and options for Member States to 
adopt.  Any private copying exemption would require a compensation 
scheme.
105
  The Directive’s vague harmonization intent has allowed for a 
varied application of private copying levying schemes from country to 
country.  This allows for an opportunity to examine how different Member 
States are ensuring fair compensation for private copying. 
The European Court of Justice has reasoned that private copying has 
undoubtedly caused harm to rightsholders and that private users should 
remedy the harm caused.
106
  The E.U. levies were justified by the 
presumption that manufacturers would pass the costs to consumers who 
would be making private copies.
107
  Due to the practical impossibility of 
determining “whether the media are marketed to intermediaries, to natural 
or legal persons for use other than for private purposes or to natural persons 
101. Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter “Information Society Directive”]. 
102. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 [hereinafter “Berne 
Convention”].  The Berne Convention, first ratified in 1886, was an international copyright 
convention whose signatories recognized international standards for protections of copyright and 
related rights for its signatories, including the U.S. Id. 
103. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 231, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997) [hereinafter “WPPT”].  The WPPT, signed by the member 
states of WIPO, the U.N.’s intellectual property agency, was implemented in the U.S. as the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Id. 
104. Information Society Directive, supra note 101.
105. RAYSMAN ET AL., supra note 42, § 5.05.
106. Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad Gen. de Autores y Editores de España, 2010,
E.C.R. I-10098, ¶ 44-45.
107. Id. ¶ 46-50.
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for use for private purposes,”
108
 the levy is based on the assumption that if 
recording media is capable of being used for reproduction, then the 
consumer benefits from the full use of the media.
109
  This is a fundamental 
difference in the underlying assumptions between the United States’ 
AHRA and the E.U.’s private copying levies.  Because the E.U. assumes 
that any technology with the ability to be used for copying (whether 
infringing or not) will exploit that ability, it is not technology specific and 
embodies a realistic view of copyright infringement today despite the 
difficulties in tracking individual infringement.
110
  This understanding 
about consumer behavior is an appropriate balance between unfettered 
technological advances and the acknowledgement of the value of artistic 
content. 
B. Finland Taxed Memory Storage, Moving Towards More Compensation
In December 2014, the Finnish Parliament overwhelmingly voted to
replace its levies system in favor of a government compensation fund to 
artists for private copying losses.
111
  This new compensation system 
follows in the footsteps of Spain and has been described as “fairer to 
consumers and better for artists because they will get more 
compensation.”
112
  This is in stark contrast to the United Kingdom, a fellow 
E.U. member, which passed a law in 2014 that legalized individual private 
copying without a compensation requirement.
113
  It is currently undergoing 
judicial review.
114
  Prior to January 1, 2015, Finland’s Teosto, their version 
108. Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int’l Sales, Inc. v. Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur
Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte Gesellschaft mbH, CURIA, ¶ 41 (July 
11, 2013). 
109. Id. ¶ 15.
110. “The devices’ recording capabilities justify being charged with the private copying
levy.”  Jaclyn Kavendek, Note, The Positive and Negative Consequences of the European Union 
Court of Justice’s Amazon Decision on International Private Copying and America, 63 
CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 789, 803 (2014). 
111. Paul Meller, Pressure for EU Copyright Levy Reform Grows: Finland Votes to Replace
Levies With a Government Fund, DIGITAL EUR. (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.digitaleurope.org/D 
esktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download&entryID=8
67&PortalId=0&TabId=353. 
112. Id. (quoting Finnish politician Henna Virkkunen).
113. Id.
114. The new law’s lack of a compensation complement has been viewed as a grave error on 
the part of the U.K. government as a decision to not protect the country’s creative industries. Tom 
Pakinkis, Industry Files for Judicial Review Over Lack of Compensation in Private Copying 
Exception, MUSIC WEEK (Nov. 27, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.musicweek.com/news/read/in 
dustry-files-for-judicial-review-over-lack-of-compensation-in-private-copying-exception/060222. 
UK Music chairman, Andy Heath, was quoted as saying, “the Private Copying legislation has 
ramifications, both national and international that puts all rights owners at risk. There has to be a 
point at which we say we believe in copyright and we will defend it against this or other 
government’s efforts to devalue it.” Id. 
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of the AARC, collected levies on imports of a wide range of consumer 
electronics including blank media and mp3 players based on memory 
storage.
115
  Now, instead of consumers paying taxes under the earlier 
private levy regime, the government will have taxpayers fund artist 
compensation directly from the state’s budget.
116
  For the 2015-2016 year, 
the Finnish legislature has appropriated 11 million euros.
117
  To put that 
number in perspective, Finland collected just under 5 million euros in 
copyright levies for 2014.
118
  This means that total artist compensation 
payouts in 2015 will be 16 million euros.  Finland’s legislature has come to 
the conclusion that while a levy system is well intentioned, the scope of 
products that are subject to levy is too technology-specific and thus ill-
suited to being future-proof.
119
  Bypassing a pricing system that relies on 
technology-specific definitions also saves the government the headache of 
fitting a levy system into new copying devices such as memory sticks, TV 
digital adapters, and online cloud storage lockers. 
C. The Canadians Are on the Right Track
Canada’s New Democratic Party supported a similar five percent
“iPod tax” on mp3 players in 2013 to bolster the funds to compensate 
artists for piracy losses.
120
  However, overwhelming outrage from Canadian 
consumers and consumer electronics companies reversed the tax and 
companies were refunded almost $27 million.
121
  To put things in 
perspective, Apple, the world’s largest company with a valuation of $700 
billion,
122
 has sold more than 390 million iPods
123
 and 700 million iPhones 
115. Teosto taxed external hard drives, starting at 9 euros for 50-250 gigabytes (“GB”) to 12
euros for 250 GB–1 terabyte (“TB”) and 18 euros for 1 TB- 3 TB.  YKSITYISEN KOPIOINNIN 
HYVITYSMAKSU, http://www.hyvitysmaksu.fi/fin/prices.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
116. Jennifer Baker, Finland Ditches Copyright Levy on Digital Kit, Pays Artists Directly, 
THE REGISTER (Dec. 12, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/12/finland_ 
ditches_copyright_levy_on_digital_devices/. 
117. Veli Sinda, Future Proof and Technology Neutral Legislation for Private Copying




120. Leslie MacKinnon, Confusion Over ‘iPod Tax’ Deepens, CBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2014
5:19 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/confusion-over-ipod-tax-deepens-1.2505522.  
121. Mike Moffat, Canada’s iPod Tax is Dead, CANADIAN BUS. (June 4, 2014),
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/blogs-and-comment/canada-ipod-tax-is-dead/. 
122. Tim Higgins, Apple Continues to Climb After Market Value Tops $700 Billion, 
BLOOMBERG BUS., http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-10/apple-closes-at-record-
market-value-of-more-than-700-billion. 
123. Sam Costello, Total Number of iPods Sold All-Time, ABOUT, http://ipod.about.
com/od/glossary/qt/number-of-ipods-sold.htm (last updated Oct. 13, 2015). 
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worldwide.
124
  The success of these two Apple products, among a sea of 
competing products, derived their value as vehicles for musical content 
consumption. 
The Copyright Board of Canada’s Canadian Private Copying 
Collective (“CPCC”) is the equivalent of the AARC.
125
  The CPCC, 
established in 1999 after the addition of Part VIII to the Canadian 
Copyright Act,
126
 collects the Private Copying Tariff placed on “blank 
audio recording mediums”
127
 for the mainly economic purpose to 
compensate artists and copyright owners for their work.
128
  The taxable 
base was to include all media where the ability to copy music was “non-
negligible.”
129
  It is interesting to note that the CPCC’s private copying 
tariff proposals are short term, effective for a year or more,
130
 and are 
delineated by media type.  Even more interesting is that the tariff on CD-
R’s was raised from twenty-one cents to twenty-nine cents in 2009 and the 
tariff on MiniDisc, a type of DAT, was eliminated in 2011 (from twenty-
nine cents).
131
  “Because technologies come and go and the value of private 
copying can change over time, the Copyright Act does not specify the types 
of media that the private copying levy applies to or the rates for each type 
of media.”
132
  Such a flexible private copying tax operating within an 




124. Sam Costello, How Many iPhones Have Been Sold Worldwide?, ABOUT, 
http://ipod.about.com/od/glossary/f/how-many-iphones-sold.htm (last updated Mar. 9, 2015). 
125. Jeremy deBeer, Working Together in a Digital World: An Introduction: Article: Locks
& Levies, 84 DENVER U.L. REV. 143, 143 (2006). 
126. Id.
127. Blank audio recording mediums are defined as “a recording medium, regardless of its
material form, onto which a sound recording may be reproduced and that is of a kind ordinarily 
used by individual consumers for that purpose, excluding any prescribed kind of recording 
medium.”  Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 79. 
128. deBeer, supra note 125, at 147.
129. The Copyright Board gave the example of non-negligible use:
[A] person who made two copies of sound recordings onto a type of medium
in each of the last two years ordinarily uses that type of medium for private
copying, even though that same person may well use many more such media
for other purposes: a medium can have more than one ordinary use.
PRIVATE COPYING 1999–2000, COPYRIGHT BD. OF CANADA, at 30 (Dec. 17, 1999), 
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c17121999-b.pdf. 
130. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 83.
131. The Private Copying Tariff, CANADIAN PRIVATE COPYING COLLECTIVE, 
http://www.cpcc.ca/en/the-cpcc/private-copying-tariff (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
132. Id.
133. Financial Highlights, CANADIAN PRIVATE COPYING COLLECTIVE, http://www.cpcc.ca
/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Financial-Highlights-2014EN.pdf. 
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Canada’s copying levy on blank media has one other distinct 
difference in that, unlike the AHRA where royalty payment shields users 
from infringement liability, the payment of taxes does not provide a 
defense.
134
  This means that even where authors are compensated by levies 
on DARTs, individual infringers who use them may still be liable for 




V. Dusting off the AHRA
In today’s digital age where cloud-based computing and digital media 
are the norm, the AHRA’s compensation scheme must be redirected to 
target realistic sources.  The Information Society Directive addressed the 
same concerns as the AHRA—technological development’s diverse 
consequences for creation, production, and exploitation of creative 
works—but enabled a much wider pool from which a royalty could be 
collected.
136
  Broadening the taxable bases under the AHRA would allow 
for fair compensation to copyright owners without restricting innovation 
because any additional cost would be passed on to the consumer.  This can 
be done by doing what the E.U. has done—assume that digital technology 
will be used to its full potential by consumers.  Any “fair compensation” 
through a royalty or levy scheme must take into account the degree of use 
of technological advances.
137
  The variety of European implementations of 
the Directive can be an invaluable example to Congress as the need for 
overhauling the Copyright Act for the digital age becomes increasingly 
necessary.  Unfortunately, the AHRA currently resembles the United 
Kingdom, which complete lacks compensation to artists for losses due to 
private copying, more than their Finnish neighbors. 
Canada’s Private Copying Tariff is also rooted in a growing need to 
compensate copyright owners due to losses in revenue brought on by 
digitalization and mass infringement.  Canada’s levy on technology that 
enables “non-negligible” music copying is vastly broader than the 
American AHRA, which only applies where media has a “primary 
purpose” of music copying.
138
  The U.S. draws a distinction between a CD-
R and CD-R Audio, while Canada does not, but given the dwindling use of 
134. Armstrong, supra note 71.
135. Id.
136. “While no new concepts for the protection of intellectual property are needed, the
current law on copyright and related rights should be adapted and supplemented to respond 
adequately to economic realities such as new forms of exploitation.” Information Society 
Directive, supra note 101, at 10.  
137. Id. at 7.
138. deBeer, supra note 125, at 148.
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Congress should amend the definition of DARDs and DARMs with 
the knowledge that, even if physical formats become totally obsolete, 
another format will take its place.  Congress should draft an amendment 
that encapsulates copying-capable devices and media including computers 
and adopt a “non-negligible” standard for applying a royalty.  The recent 
resurgence in the vinyl format is evidence that consumer preferences are 
unpredictable.
140
  America is in desperate need for copyright reform and 
Congress would be well served to remember that “[u]ncertainty . . . is the 
only certainty there is.”
141
  Congress should also explore expansion of 
taxable consumer electronics to include hard drives and mp3 players, 
similar to the Finnish regime prior to the adoption of the new government 
fund, which pays compensation to artists directly.  Perhaps Congress would 
be willing to even provide for artist compensation directly through a federal 
fund and bypass the headache of navigating specific technologies in the age 
of designed obsolescence and consumer product convergence.
142
  This last 
suggestion, to mirror Finland and Spain, would allow for artist 
compensation that is both technologically neutral and future-proof and 
ensure that fair compensation is not at the mercy of the unpredictability of 
consumer technology and trends. 
Alarmed by its dwindling effectiveness in carrying out its mandate, 
the AARC’s new lawsuit opens up the possibility for renewed examination 
of the flaws within the AHRA’s narrow construction which made (and 
continue to make) the Act unsuitable for fair compensation and protection 
for copyright owners.  Though there is the potential for the District Court 
of Washington D.C. to make a departure from RIAA v. Diamond
143
 in the 
current litigation, many think the issue is dead.
144
  The AHRA, as it stands 
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http://www.cnn.com/2010/SHOWBIZ/Music/07/19/cd.digital.sales/. 
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copying. Id. 
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today, does not effectively provide any sort of “fair compensation,” but it 
does carry some utility by serving as a cautionary tale that a narrowly 
drafted statute is no match for a digital world.
145
 
Now is the time for Congress to act.  The AHRA’s exceptions for CD-
R and hard drives must be abolished to give copyright owners a realistic 
chance of fair compensation.  Applying an “iPod tax” based on memory 
capacity, similar to Finland, or on all blank media, such as in Canada, are 
both better options than the current state of the AHRA in compensating 
artists for revenue losses brought on by the digitization of technology. 
VI. Conclusion
After twenty-three years and one litigated case, copyright holders’ 
ability to maximize their proper remuneration for creative works slips 
further into the digital space.  The AHRA, in effect, came out squarely on 
the side of consumer device manufacturers and continues to snub its nose at 
the intended beneficiaries of the Copyright Act.  If Congress intends to give 
the AHRA and the Copyright Act the teeth necessary to properly 
compensate rightsholders, Congress should look to the E.U.’s Information 
Society Directive, which explicitly acknowledged that “[a] rigorous, 
effective system for the protection of copyright and related rights is one of 
the main ways of ensuring that . . . cultural creativity and production 
receive the necessary resources and of safeguarding the independence and 
dignity of artistic creators and performers.”
146
 
The proposal that Congress amend and expand the AHRA would 
generate real revenue for artists, in line with the duty to enforce “fair 
compensation” while simultaneously preventing future technology-specific 
issues.  The AARC’s suit against car manufacturers demonstrates a 
desperate need for a fresh perspective that considers the realities of digital 
music consumption and technological advancement.  The AHRA is 
outdated, forever stuck in 1992, when in-car home copying was never 
debated or considered.  Copyright and technology are closely intertwined; 
technology is used to both create copyrightable works and to infringe on 
them.  Europe and Canada are actively working to bolster their cost-
shifting compensation schemes to protect artists in the digital age.  Looking 
forward, Congress would do well to keep in mind the unpredictable 
direction of music trends and amend the AHRA to inject it with the 
deliberate vagueness necessary to encompass new technologies.  Without 
it, the U.S. Copyright Office will be powerless to stop device 
manufacturers that profit from and enable small time infringement without 
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at least attempting to secure moderate compensation for authors and, in 
essence, letting the beast go untamed. 
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